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Chapter 6

The Social Location of Scientific
Practices 1
Hugh Lacey

The mainstream tradition of modern science denies the historicity of
scientific practices. It denies that their character changes, and must change,
in fundamental ways that arise historically, and that are responsive to and
shaped significantly by varying circumstances. In Section 1 I will identify
several presuppositions that have been commonly used to support this denial:
most notably, that the object of science is ahistorical and its methodology
essentially unchanging, and that the character of basic scientific methodology
is not dialectically linked with applied science. In Section 2 Kuhn's rejection of
the presuppositions about the object and unchanging methodology of science
will be endorsed, thus providing support for what Margolis has referred to as
a 'remarkable (but somewhat muffled)' version of the historicity of science. 2
Then, in Section 3, drawing upon a detailed analysis of a contemporary
controversy between agrobiotechnology and agroecology, I will move beyond
Kuhn and also reject the other presupposition that there are no dialectical links
between methodology and application.
Specifically I will argue that the character of scientific practices reflects
mutually reinforcing relations with the social location in which they are
conducted, that is, relations with the value-outlooks · of their practitioners
and their enabling institutions, and the interests that will be served through
applications of their products. It is a small step from this to endorsing an
'unmuffled' version of the historicity of scientific practices, one that admits
that variations in the character of scientific practices may be dialectically
linked with historical and cultural variations in the realm of daily life and
experience and in the structures of social practice.
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1 Scientific Practices as Lacking Historicity
Let me briefly recapitulate a story that articulates an important part of the
self-understanding of the modem scientific tradition, and that has often been
re-told. Science has a history, a history of progress: of growth, accumulation
and refinement of scientific knowledge, and of elimination of error. It is a
history in which methodology plays a central role. Provided only that scientific
practices are kept free from outside interference and nourished from time
to time by the input of creative genius, methodology ensures the continued
unfolding of the progressive development of science. Scientific methodology is
systematic and empirical, rooted in experiment and measurement. It prescribes
that empirical data be brought to bear upon theories that, using the resources
of mathematically articulated lexicons, posit representations of phenomena
and their underlying order and law. Apart from refinements of detail, scope
and precision, scientific methodology does not change. Thus, the 'scientific
revolution' of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marks the effective
beginnings of science (anticipated only by scattered fragments of scientific
knowledge), not a fundamental change in the methodological character of
scientific practices.
Since then, the story continues, the cognitive (epistemic) credentials
of scientific methodology have been certified and repeatedly vindicated.
Technological success that has been informed by scientific knowledge has
been one source of the vindication. Another has been the knowledge and
understanding of 'the world' ('the natural world,' 'the material world') - of
natural laws, and of things, events, states of affairs, phenomena, structures
and their underlying components, processes and interactions - that have
accumulated and been refined, and whose compass continues to expand,
bounded only by the limit of a 'complete account' of 'the material world,'
one that in due course would encompass all phenomena.
The story admits of competing versions with different emphases about, for
example, the primacy of theory or experiment and the significance of applied
science. In all versions, however, the tale of progress attends principally to
such matters as theories that have been developed, available data, technical
possibilities for experiment and measurement, methodological matters, and
the (creative) inputs of individuals (or groups) of scientists. That way the
'rationality,' 'universality' and 'objectivity' of the cumulative and developing
process are able to be emphasized. There is a place in the story for social,
economic and political factors: sometimes the interests of utility lead to
a focus on a particular object of inquiry and, more generally, the rhythms
and organization of scientific research depend upon the availability of the
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appropriate material resources and social conditions. Even so, the fundamental
dynamic of scientific progress is 'rational': science is progressively, and with
ever greater refinement, gaining knowledge of objects of 'the material world.'
Social (and hence historical) factors may lead to giving priority, even urgency,
to gaining knowledge of specific instances of these objects; but gaining
knowledge of them contributes to the overall accumulation and refinement
of knowledge of 'the material world.' It is the accumulation and refinements
that matter most. The rest, including the temporal order in which objects are
investigated, is incidental. Nowhere in the story does the character of scientific
practices change in fundamental ways; they do not exhibit historicity.

1.1

Suppositions Supporting the Denial ofHistoricity

At the root of this denial of historicity are the following three suppositions:
1

2

3

Science aims to gain a kind of understanding that is expressed in theories
that match ever more completely and accurately an ahistorical object,
'the material world,' whose underlying order (laws; and structures and
their components, processes, interactions) is ontologically independent of
human actions, desires, conceptions, observations and investigations. 3
The methodology of modern scientific practices (subject only to
refinements of precision, scope and the like, but not to any fundamental
change) enables us progressively to gain understanding of this ahistorical
object - so that there is no deep historical dialectic of methodology and
object of inquiry, and so that the questions posed in basic science (while
they might depend on the results of previous inquiries and the availability
of instrumentation and appropriate mathematical and conceptual resources)
do not concern objects insofar as they are historically variable, socially
located, or playing integral roles in human practices.
The acceptability of scientific theories depends only on considerations
involving their features and their relations with empirical data of selected
kinds.

Clearly, and consistent with supposition 1, the actual arrangements of
material objects in our vicinity are not causally independent of human
affairs. These arrangements may be consequences of scientific applications;
so much so that, although science supposedly lacks historicity, in virtue of
its applications it has become nevertheless a historical agent of extraordinary
importance. Indeed, it has been held, the very success of science in informing
technological developments is explained in terms of its having gained sound

t
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understanding of 'the material world. ' 4 According to the story under review,
the historical agency of science may account for the ready availability in the
advanced industrial countries of the social conditions and material resources
required for the pursuit of science. Moreover, nowadays a good deal of research
depends upon the availability of instruments that are the products of the most
advanced and sophisticated technology, whose availability is itself made
possible by scientific developments. This means that the historical agency of
science functions as an 'instrumental partner' of scientific research, one that
enables the methodology to be deployed in a more refined way (for example,
enabling us to obtain greater precision in measurement and to explore hitherto
inaccessible spaces). It feeds ·back so as to serve the cognitive (epistemic)
interests of gaining scientific understanding (a 'happy coincidence' of
social practical interests and knowledge-gaining interests 5), but it leaves the
fundamental character of scientific methodology essentially unscathed. Thus,
the denial of historicity also involves the supposition:
4

The historical agency of science (exercised through its applications) is
only a consequence and an instrumental partner of successful scientific
practice; it is not a dialectical partner, one that feeds back so as to influence
the fundamental methodological character of these practices.

Affirming the historicity of science involves denying suppositions 1 and 2:
denying that the object of scientific investigation is ahistorical, and maintaining
that there is a dialectic between methodology and object of inquiry. It is
deepened by also denying supposition 4, affirming that there is a dialectic
between methodology and the practices of socially applied science. Kuhn
has made a compelling case for the denial of suppositions 1 and 2, though he
seems to accept supposition 4. 6 Before addressing Kuhn's argument, let us
extend the story being re-told a little further.
1.2

Do Soundly Accepted Theories Represent the 'Material World'?

According to our story, objects as grasped in the practices of basic science,
that is, objects as represented in soundly accepted theories, are (approximately)
identical to objects as they are in the underlying order of the material world.
Scientific practices, and the modes of interaction and thought that constitute
them, enable us to grasp things as they are in the ahistorical 'material world,'
abstracted from the context and conditions of our investigations, and indeed
from all human related contexts. Since scientific practices are themselves
historical, how can this be so? Methodology is the key to the answer; but how
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is it that a methodology deployed within a historical practice can enable us
to grasp the ahistorical?
It is able to do so, a common response goes, in virtue of the character of
and relationships between theory and empirical data. To elaborate: theories
developed in scientific practices deploy carefully expressed posits (and
models), typically in mathematical form, about underlying (non-apparent)
structure and its components, process, interaction and law; so that theories
abstract the phenomena investigated from their places in the social order, in
daily life and experience, and even in scientific practices themselves. And data
are sought out and reported, and the conditions in which they may be obtained
are often created, in the course of experimental and measurement practices.
Relevant data, obtained from observing phenomena of which a theory is
proposed to provide understanding, meet the condition of intersubjectivity
(and, where possible, replicability), and quantitative and experimental data
are of special significance. Then understanding of objects of 'the material
world' is expressed in soundly accepted theories.
A theory is accepted if its posits (pertaining to certain domains of
phenomena) are put into the stock of established scientific knowledge, the
stock of those posits judged to be such that further investigation or testing of
them would produce at most refinements of accuracy and scope. 7 A theory
is soundly accepted (of the phenomena of a specified domain) if it satisfies
certain criteria, that is, if it manifests the cognitive values highly in relation
to the available data from this domain - if it has specified characteristics (for
example, consistency, simplicity), relations with other accepted theories (for
example, inter-theoretic consistency, consilience), relations with displaced
theories (for example, being a source of interpretive power of the strengths
and weaknesses of a displaced theory), and most importantly relations with
available empirical data (for example, empirical adequacy, explanatory and
predictive power). 8 Theories that have been soundly accepted of specified
domains have also reliably informed numerous practical (technological)
applications.
What legitimates the move made in the story from (a) 'T manifests the
cognitive values highly with respect to D' to (b) 'T represents (matches) order
of the "material world" underlying D'? (Tis a theory and Dis a domain of
phenomena.) One might respond: Is it not obvious, given that T represents
the phenomena of D in abstraction from the relations they may have with
human and social affairs, in terms of their being generated from the underlying
order, and that the sound acceptance of T depends only on judgments of the
manifestation of the cognitive values in T with respect to D? Moreover, that the
move has been frequently and casually made throughout the course of modem
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science suggests that it is taken to be obvious. In what else could the cognitive
value of T consist other than a match with parts of the 'material world'?
Well, it could consist in confirming (c) 'T encapsulates well the possibilities
of phenomena of D in so far as they derive from the generative power of the
underlying order (their 'material possibilities'),' or (equivalently) in grasping
these phenomena qua abstracted from their human and social contexts.
Elsewhere I have argued that the move from (a) to (b) is not mediated
by (d) 'T reliably informs technological applications';9 but the move from
(a) to (c) is supported by (d). Often the move from (a) to (b) is made against
background commitment to materialist metaphysics, which may be considered
as a suitable elaboration of the posit that all phenomena are lawful or that all
possibilities are material possibilities: the 'material world' - the ahistorical
order underlying things - really is such that it can be matched by (and only
by) the kinds of posits put forward in modem scientific theories. Were there a
sound a priori case for materialist metaphysics, this might be compelling. But
today, for the most part, those who espouse materialist metaphysics do so on
the ground that it is an extrapolation from established scientific understanding
and the direction of its expected growth. Then, if materialist metaphysics
provides the ground for the move, the question is begged.

2 Kuhn's Account of the Historicity of Science
Kuhn maintains that there is nothing in the character of scientific practices
that justifies the move from (a) to (b ), 10 and that, furthermore, attention to the
actual history of science suggests that the move would be clearly unjustified.
In the history of science, he maintains, we do not find steady accumulation and
refinement, but instead periods of fundamental discontinuity in the character of
scientific activity- discontinuities (for example) in what is considered a theory
worthy of provisional investigation, in what are the appropriate phenomena
to investigate for the sake of gaining empirical data ( and in the descriptive
categories of the data) that are to be fitted by theories, and in what kinds of
posits are taken to be central for shaping scientific investigation.

2.1

Soundly Accepted Theories are Developed and Consolidated under a
'Strategy' ('Paradigm')

According to Kuhn, if theory and empirical data are taken to be the major
elements of scientific methodology, no sense can be made of the actual
history of science. Kuhn proposed a third element: paradigm, of which
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I will consider just one aspect: within a paradigm, research is conducted
under a strategy. 11 A strategy specifies constraints upon theories that are
taken to be admissible for provisional consideration (and possible eventual
acceptance), and (reciprocally) criteria upon the kinds of empirical data (and
the phenomena from the observation and measurement of which they are
obtained) that are selected as those appropriate for being brought into the
appropriate relationships with theories. These are the kinds of data needed
for testing and selecting among provisionally entertained theories, and
those that describe phenomena so as to enable their explanations and the
encapsulation of their possibilities. Admissible theories may be constrained,
for example, to be formulated with the resources of a specified lexicon (for
example, the teleological/sensory categories of Aristotelian physics, or the
mathematical/mechanical ones of Galilean physics), and the data may be
selected (generally subject to the condition of intersubjectivity and, where
appropriate, replicability) in virtue of (for example) being representative of
phenomena of daily life and experience, or of pertaining to experimental and
measurement practices.
Given this third methodological element, we are able to identify two key
(logically distinct) moments of choice: choice of strategy to adopt in research
practices, choice of theory to accept or reject. Choice of theory is, then, in
the first instance choice among provisionally entertained theories that fit
the constraints of the adopted strategy. 12 When properly made, it involves
judgment about which one of them best manifests the cognitive values with
respect to the available data, about whether the available data are sufficient and
about whether the manifestation meets high enough standards for accepting the
theory of the relevant domains of phenomena. 13 Accepted theories encapsulate
soundly certain kinds of possibilities that these phenomena permit. (Successful
application testifies to this.) So adopting a strategy involves identifying the
kinds of possibilities desired to be encapsulated; accepting a theory involves
identifying (typically through consolidating posits about how to actualize
them) the genuine possibilities of these kinds.
In the light of the Kuhnian insight, our initial story can be reinterpreted
or (more accurately) replaced by a narrative ofresearch conducted under a
particular set of strategies - that I call materialist strategies (MS)-that have
been adopted virtually exclusively within the modem scientific tradition. 14
MS incorporate the core methodological elements cited in the story. Under
them, theories are constrained to those with the lexical and mathematical
resources to be able to formulate posits of underlying order - structure and
its components, process, interaction and law, where laws express relations
among quantities. These theories identify the possibilities of phenomena in
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terms of the generative power of the underlying order (the ones I have called
'material possibilities'), in abstraction from any place they may have in human
experience and practical activity, from any links with social value and with
the human, social and ecological possibilities that they might also admit. The
'material possibilities' of phenomena include possibilities that are identical
with possibilities for technological application. Reciprocally, under MS,
data are selected (subject to intersubjectivity and replicability) so that their
descriptive categories are generally quantitative, devoid of the categories of
intentionality and value, applicable in virtue of measurement, instrumental
and experimental operations.
Research conducted under MS has been extraordinarily successful: it has
generated and continues to generate soundly accepted theories of a great
variety of phenomena; and these theories have been the source of numerous
and varied technological applications. Kuhn has little interest in applications.
And, as I have said, he does not take the success of MS in producing soundly
accepted theories to show that these theories match the ahistorical 'material
world.' Instead, for Kuhn, it establishes that the world can be (to a marked
extent) well matched to, or become amenable to grasp within, the categories of
the lexicons deployed under MS. 15 I add that 'material possibilities' of things
are successfully identified under these MS; and, in opposition to those who
adhere to materialist metaphysics, I caution that there is no reason to believe
that the possibilities of things are exhausted by their material possibilities.
Within the Kuhnian picture, the object of scientific inquiry is phenomena
qua grasped under a strategy. Since a strategy is a methodological innovation
of scientific practices, this object is not ahistorical. For Kuhn himself, the aim
of science is to solve puzzles whose very definition is strategy-bounded. In
the final analysis the very questions posed in scientific inquiry are not about
the 'material world,' but about the power of a strategy to grasp phenomena. It
follows that suppositions 1 and 2 (see previous section) are not sustainable. On
my additional gloss, the aim of science is to gain understanding of phenomena,
and this includes encapsulating the possibilities that they allow. 16 But
phenomena allow many and varied kinds of possibilities, not all of which can
simultaneously be co-actualized or even co-investigated- so actual scientific
investigation opts to pursue certain classes of valued possibilities, generally
those valued for the sake of application, whose realizability and possibility
of being investigated is historically conditioned. Thus the unsustainability of
suppositions 1 and 2 is reinforced.
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'Fruitfulness ' as Ground for Adopting a Strategy

What about supposition 4? It could not be sustained, if (for example)
the (rational) grounds for adopting a strategy include that it gives rise to
applications of special interest for those holding a particular value-outlook.
So we must attend to the grounds for adopting a strategy.
According to Kuhn, a strategy is adopted for the sake of defining and
solving puzzles, or (as I prefer to put it) for the sake of generating theories
and acquiring appropriate empirical data so that theories can come to be
accepted in virtue of manifesting the cognitive values highly. Then, a strategy
is worthy of adoption only if it is demonstrated to be fruitful - actually to be,
and continuing to be, a source of theories that come to be soundly accepted of
certain domains of phenomena. A fruitful strategy, adopted in the first instance
following an exemplary achievement, enables investigation to take place in the
relevant field; 17 and, for Kuhn, so long as a strategy remains fruitful, research
should be conducted exclusively under it. Within the scientific tradition, he
maintains, fruitfulness is sufficient, as well as necessary, for the adoption of
a strategy. Normally a currently fruitful strategy is in place. Then, engaging
in scientific research implies adopting it - so that normally questions about
adoption of strategy are neither controversial nor addressed explicitly within
the scientific community18 - until such time as the limits of its fruitful unfolding
are reached. Such limits become apparent when anomalous phenomena (which
have become considered important for the unfolding research) are identified:
phenomena that cannot, after prolonged and skilful investigation, be fitted
into theories that both meet the constraints of the strategies and manifest the
cognitive values highly, but at best into theories that retain empirical adequacy
at the price of increasingly diminished manifestations of such other cognitive
values as predictive and explanatory power and keeping ad hoc hypotheses
to a minimum.
On Kuhnian views,. strategies and the lexicons they bear are human
creations; and a soundly accepted theory is one that succeeds in fitting certain
phenomena of the world into the structured lexicon of a strategy. So it is
expected that any strategy will have limits, that its fruitfulness will eventually
become exhausted. (Any one kind of strategy will fail to encapsulate various
kinds of possibilities of phenomena.) When the limits of an established strategy
are reached, and- according to Kuhn - (allowing a certain latitude ofjudgment
about when they are reached) only then, does the scientific tradition license the
search for another strategy; and then the search is for a new strategy that can
grasp the anomalies of the old one. At such (revolutionary) moments most of
the old constraints are lifted, conflicting perspectives are engaged and there
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is much trial and error, until such time as a new strategy emerges (in a new
exemplary achievement that offers promise of further fruitful developments)
that enables the grasp of the old anomalies. 19 Then that strategy comes to
demand the allegiance of the scientific community.
Kuhn intends his picture to be both descriptive (under idealization) of the
history of science, and normative for scientific practice. Indeed, normally it
does suffice for scientific research to proceed under a single strategy,provided
that one accepts that what count as scientifically interesting phenomena are
defineq within the unfolding tradition of science, and that the aim of science
is to resolve puzzles about them or to come to accept (soundly) theories of
them. Proceeding in this way enables there to be successful research, practically
ensures that empirical considerations will eventually lead to clear demarcation
of the limits of the strategy, and keeps a measure of continuity - through the
special role accorded to anomalies of old strategies- across the 'revolutionary'
divides that separate the periods of hegemony of succeeding strategies. Note
that an argument cannot be extracted out of this that the new strategy is the only
one that could have developed as successor to the old one. 20 Within the Kuhnian
picture, there are elements of radical contingency: that any successor at all
will actually emerge, and if one does, what its specific character will be. The
emergence of a new strategy may be influenced causally by all sorts of 'extrascientific' factors (religious, metaphysical, cultural), but what matters, what
legitimates the adoption of the strategy, is that it generates theories in which
the anomalous phenomena can be grasped and which define new puzzles. If
the aim is to solve puzzles about scientifically interesting phenomena and to
introduce new ones to be solved, that is enough.
Kuhn has provided a brilliant account of the transition from the hegemony
ofAristotelian to that of materialist (Galilean) strategies21 as well as some less
developed accounts of other 'revolutionary' transitions. 22 Following the former
transition, few products ofAristotelian science have remained in the generally
accepted stock of knowledge. With the hindsight of developments under MS
(including new data, greater sensitivity to the role of certain cognitive values,
and higher standards for estimating the degree of manifestation of the cognitive
values in theories), it became apparent that Aristotelian physical theories were
soundly accepted of very few phenomena. 23
Some of Kuhn's critics think that his view entails that, with the eventual
anticipated surpassing of MS as framers of research, few of its products
will remain in the stock of knowledge. (Thus they accuse Kuhn of a kind
of relativism that seems manifestly unacceptable when we think of the
discoveries of modern science and their applied successes.) But Kuhn's
view does not entail this. Under MS, numerous theories have been soundly
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accepted of countless domains of phenomena. These theories encapsulate well
an increasing number and variety of the material possibilities of phenomena;
and - while acknowledging the truism that empirical methodologies cannot
provide certainty - there is no reason to hold that subsequent developments
of the tradition will lead to removing from the stock of knowledge the
confirmation of these possibilities. Similarly, there is no reason to anticipate
(for example) that the atoms of modem atomic theory will go the way of the
four terrestrial elements of Aristotelian physics, at least if we consider atoms
to be the constituents of molecules with capacities for generating specified
effects in specified (experimental and technological) spaces. Subsequent
research may lead to their refinement and elaboration, but given how soundly
accepted atomic theory is, not to their rejection. I have followed Cartwright's
language here, 24 and her claim that established scientific knowledge is largely
of capacities of objects: that they tend to have certain effects under specified
(typically experimental) conditions, without the further supposition that
such capacities (rather than others they might also have) will be exercised
significantly in all ('natural') situations. Gaining such knowledge of capacities
of objects does not ground the supposition that knowledge of the 'material
world' - of the world as it is independent of its relations with human beings
- has been gained. Only idle skepticism would cast doubt on the existence
of atoms today: there are atoms in the world 'that we live in' and 'that we
have investigated,' and we know their capacities as exercised in various
experimental and technological spaces and also (no doubt) in many spaces,
not of human causal origin, in which there is no (relevant) human causal
involvement. Kuhn's picture fits easily with many kinds of scientific realism.
But the 'world that we live in' is not the 'world as it is independent of its
relations with human beings.'
Thus, it is consistent with the Kuhnian picture that, under MS, we gain
accumulating knowledge of 'material possibilities ' ofphenomena. But, one
might ask, is this really any different from accumulating knowledge of the
ahistorical material worlcf? It is, and the difference is of central importance.
In the first place, the latter idiom, unlike the former, is usually linked with
the view that all possibilities of phenomena are (in the final analysis) material
possibilities, and in particular with materialist reductive accounts of human
cognitive (rational) and moral capacities. Secondly, the material possibilities
of phenomena are those possibilities that are encapsulated by the generative
power of the underlying order posited of the phenomena; they are constituted
as such within scientific practices conducted under MS. Some of them are
realized in, and realizable only in, experimental and technological spaces of
human creation (having been posited as the possibilities of these historically
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bounded spaces). Others are realized in spaces whose underlying causal
order, as represented under MS, has no relevant human involvement, but
where that causal order is posited, generally drawing upon the resources of
theories accepted of experimental spaces, following scientific observation
aided by instruments themselves authenticated in the course of experimental
and technological practices. (In some spaces there can be good reason to
hold that their possibilities are exhausted by their material possibilities.) This
causal order is constituted in the course of scientific practices as a projection
from experimental and technological practices; there is no basis here to infer
to the features of an underlying order that is ontologically independent of
human beings.25
For a theory developed of a domain of phenomena under MS, 'T manifests
the cognitive values highly of D' implies 'T soundly encapsulates material
possibilities of D. ' These propositions become established at a particular
time. Nevertheless, once established, especially if further vindicated by the
success of practical applications, there is no general reason to expect that
they will become vulnerable to refutation in the light of outcomes of research
under different strategies, either current alternative strategies or future ones.
Strategies change, and so the fundamental character of ongoing scientific
investigation changes, but that permits a permanent residue of knowledge to
remain, a residue that may or may not become rearticulated (as a particular
case or as an approximation) under a subsequent strategy. Historicity of
scientific practices does not imply the historical relativity of scientific
knowledge. It does make likely, however, that quite a bit of what is taken
to be established scientific knowledge (but with insufficient scrutiny of the
degree of manifestation of the cognitive values) will come to be recognized
as not properly part of the permanent stock of knowledge. And it fits easily
with the historical (and cultural) relativity of interest in applying particular
items of scientific knowledge.
As more material possibilities become soundly encapsulated in theories,
the greater is the range of technological possibilities opened up, a matter with
profound social implications. For Kuhn, technological application remains
principally a consequence of scientific developments, and also a source of
additional empirical data to bring to bear on theories, especially by way of
the instrumental partnership referred to in Section 1. That there is widespread
technological application, and that it is desired, are not among the (rational)
grounds for adopting MS; those grounds are (normally) solely connected with
fruitfulness, and also (at 'revolutionary' moments) with being able to grasp
the anomalies of the old strategy. Through this complex and subtle narrative
Kuhn endorses the historicity of science: denying suppositions 1 and 2, while
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retaining supposition 4, and thus preserving an essentially internalist narrative
of the history of science.

3 The Role of Applications
'Application' refers to two interacting and not sharply separable roles that
scientific theories can play in social practical life. A theory may apply to
significant phenomena of daily life and experience; and it may be applied in
practical activity. It applies to those phenomena when it is used, by way of
representing them with its categories and principles, to provide understanding
of them. 'Applying to' involves identifying (modeling) phenomena as
characterized using everyday categories with phenomena as represented
in the theory. A theory is applied in practical (often technological) activity
when its posits inform such concerns of practice as the workings of things,
means to ends, the attainability of ends, and the consequences of realizing
the possible. 26
In Kuhn's picture, applications are important to the unfolding of the
scientific tradition only as enticement for the provision of the social, material
and instrumental requirements of the conduct of research. Its credibility
depends on dissociating the value, conduct and character of scientific practices
from social and moral evaluations of applications of the knowledge they
produce.
I will now offer an alternative picture in which applications (to and in)
are more central than Kuhn admits. In it, particular strategies are adopted
rationally (in part)- subject to fruitfulness remaining a necessary condition of
their adoption - because they can be expected to give rise to certain kinds of
applications. 27 Phenomena are in fact (and should be) brought to the attention
of basic scientific investigation, not only from the scientific tradition's own
unfolding (as Kuhn holds), but also from the realm of daily life and experience
and social practice, from the 'world in which we live.' Science aims to provide
understanding of phenomena and, in doing so, where appropriate to make
sense of our experience and to inform our social practices. Strategies worthy
of adoption should normally produce theories applicable to phenomena
significant for current daily life and applicable in current social practices
- though normally and desirably (for substantive and methodological reasons)
the reach of scientific investigation should not be limited to phenomena
involved in these applications. Many significant phenomena of daily life and
social practice are not fixed across historical change and cultural variety so
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that depending on the desired applications, different strategies may be needed.
If so, supposition 4 could not be sustained.
In order to provide detail and credibility for this alternative picture, I will
show that, for some significant phenomena, competing (fruitful) strategies are
possible. I will focus upon phenomena encountered in farming practices. For
them, which of the strategies becomes adopted in research depends upon the
social location of the investigator, and upon the way in which applications are
valued from this location. Different social locations (on the one hand, the neoliberal global economic project; on the other, grassroots movements of poor
farmers) lead to the adoption of largely different (competing) strategies.

3.1

Do Materialist Strategies Suffice to Shape Research?

The modem realm of daily life and experience is unintelligible apart from
the applications of knowledge gained under MS, since it has been shaped
to a great extent by identifying and realizing novel material possibilities of
things. That provides a good reason for MS to be adopted in the scientific
community. 28 But, the possibilities of natural phenomena encountered in daily
life and social practice are not reducible to their material possibilities, those
they have in virtue of the generative power of their underlying structure ( and
its components), process, interaction and law. Why, then, prioritize material
possibilities in the investigation of natural phenomena? Why not attempt to
shape and adopt strategies under which other classes of their .possibilities
might be identified, for example those they have in virtue of their places in
human life and experience and social/ecological systems? Why, for example,
prioritize investigating seeds so as to identify the possibilities open to them
under the genetic modification procedures of current biotechnology, rather
than those they have in virtue of their place in productive and sustainable
agroecological systems?
The following answer might be part of the continuation of the story told
in Section 1: non-material possibilities of objects (phenomena) supervene on
their material possibilities. The realization of a material possibility (where
human interactions with natural objects are involved) may be identical to the
realization of a social/ecological possibility. Successfully producing genetically
modified seeds and reaping a harvest from them, for example, is also at the
same time (under current socioeconomic conditions) furthering the process
in which seeds become commodities. 29 But the class of material possibilities
can (in principle) be identified simply in terms of the generability of each of
its members from the underlying order. Some material possibilities may also
be identified qua social possibilities - but systematically all of them may be
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identified from the generative power of the underlying order. Methodologically,
then, it is proper to separate the investigations of material and other kinds of
possibilities; and so to confine the latter to (for example) the various social
sciences, in which the conditions, interests served and other consequences
of realizing material possibilities are investigated. The same natural science
suffices for all value-outlooks - for, regardless of value-outlook, all of the
possibilities of interest are, or supervene on, material possibilities.
This answer leaves it open that particular strategies of the social sciences
might be linked with particular value-outlooks, but not those of natural
science. Natural science, according to the continued story, is neutral: that is,
the projects of virtually any value-outlook (for example, of corporation or of
movement of poor farmers) can make use of some applications made available
by science in ways that strengthen or further its expression; and (in principle)
the applications made available by science can serve all (currently contested)
value-outlooks in an even-handed way. 30
I take it to be uncontroversial that a considerable body of scientific
knowledge gained under MS (molecular chemistry, viral and bacterial causes
of disease, soil nutrients, the components of a nutritious diet, electromagnetic
radiation - to give a sample) is available to be applied in ways that can
strengthen the social expression of virtually any value-outlook that is actually
entertained today. This explains why it is widely valued (across value-outlooks)
that scientific knowledge has been gained under MS, and it provides a reason
for the esteemed place that research under MS has throughout the scientific
community. It does not follow that research conducted exclusively under MS
(or that all research conducted under it) is valued, as distinct from inquiry
in which research under MS is balanced by (or subordinated to) research
conducted under alternative strategies. That is because, in contradiction
with our story, the products of research under MS are in fact not neutral; the
'even-handedness' condition is not satisfied. Overall, and especially in fields
like agrobiotechnology in which research_ is dominated by specific versions
of MS, their applications favor those value-outlooks whose central practices
and projects are conducted so as to further the expression of a distinctive way
of valuing control of natural objects and phenomena. I call this distinctive
way 'the modem valuation of control' (MVC). 31 MVC concerns the scope of
control, its centrality in daily life, its relative unsubordination to other moral
and social values, and the deep sense that control is the characteristic human
stance towards natural objects; so that the expansion of technologies (informed
by knowledge gained under MS) into more and more spheres of life and into
becoming the means for solving more and more problems is highly valued.
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Favoring value-outlooks that contain MVC violates even-handedness
because the value-outlooks of various contemporary movements and groups
contest MVC; and theories, consolidated under MS, do not apply to key
phenomena and in significant parts of projects of importance to them. Feminist,
environmental and anti-' globalization' groups bear value-outlooks that contest
MVC, and also (of special interest for my argument) grassroots organizations
in Latin America who adopt alternative value-outlooks that emphasize such
values as 'local empowerment,' full recognition of the entire body of human
rights specified in international documents, and environmental sustainability. 32
In the agricultural projects of the grassroots organizations, phenomena of
sustainable productivity, preservation of biodiversity and meeting the food
and nutrition needs of the local community are of central importance, and
their practices aim to preserve and enhance productive and sustainable
agroecosyst~ms over the long haul. 33 Theories developed under MS have
important applications to these phenomena and in these practices, but they
are limited (or subordinated); for example, they have supplied knowledge
of some of the constituents and mechanisms of agroecosystems (microorganisms, chemical nutrients), but they shed little light on the possibilities
of enhancing agroecosystems - in contrast, for example, to that they shed on
relations between crop yields and chemical inputs to production, and on the
possibilities of production with transgenic seeds.
How can that be? Do not agroecological possibilities (like all social/
ecological possibilities) supervene upon material possibilities? Despite the
way our story continues, I am aware of no compelling argument that they do.
Even if they do, however, it does not follow that they supervene upon material
possibilities that (even in principle) may be identified under the kinds of MS
(with their accompanying lexicons) that it is within human powers to develop.
Some agroecological possibilities may supervene on material possibilities of
such complexity, subtlety and variability with locale that human beings may
not be able to identify them in the course of research conducted under MS.
Be that as it may, numerous material possibilities certainly evade the grasp
of theories currently or foreseeably accepted under MS. These theories also
are unable to identify the agroecological possibilities, whose realization is
sought in projects expressive of the values of' local empowerment.' (This is
a symptom of the lack of neutrality of the products of MS overall.) If these
agroecological possibilities do supervene upon material possibilities, and
if the latter are to be identified, then (at least for the time being) it will be
qua agroecological possibilities, and not qua generable from the underlying
order. It will be qua possibilities that things have in virtue of being part of
a more or less self-regulating system, in virtue of relations and interactions
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they have with other constituents of the system and the role they play in its
self-regulation. In so far as such agroecological possibilities may be pertinent
to desired applications, identification of them will have to be gained through
research conducted under alternative strategies - agroecological strategies
(AES).
It is now clear why the products of research under MS can not meet the
even-handedness condition. Applying current knowledge gained under MS
(for example, in agrobiotechnology) may require conditions that would
undermine the valued agroecological systems. It remains that knowledge
gained under MS is genuine knowledge; it is expressed in soundly accepted
theories or with the aid of their categories. When alternative strategies are
.adopted, and their results applied, that remains untouched. Consistency with
soundly accepted theories is a mark of the rational; applying them need not
be. Legitimation of applications involves not only that the theory has been
soundly accepted, but also that its applications serve the interests of the 'right'
value-outlook. When a theory is applicable only in a context where certain
values are expressed and embodied, to appeal to its sound acceptance as
sufficient legitimation for application implies improperly limiting the range
of values that may be (rationally) held. When we separate the investigations
of material and other possibilities, we study things in abstraction from the
conditions for the realization of their possibilities; so it will not be part of the
'technical' investigation to figure out the social conditions under which the
possibilities may be realized - so we may miss that to interact with a thing so
as to realize certain of its material possibilities may actually be also to treat
it as a certain type of social object.

3.2

Agroecological Strategies

AES and agrobiotechnological strategies (BTS) compete. 34 Their established
theories are not inconsistent, but they encapsulate largely different classes
of possibilities, which (for the most part) cannot be co-realized in the same
fields. The competition concerns which class of possibilities to attempt to
realize in agricultural practices: those of biotechnology which are of special
interest where MVC reigns, or those of agroecology whose interest derives
(in the first instance) from the values of 'local empowerment'? 'Technical
scientific' issues pervade the competition: What is possible? What are the
risks of application? Can the risks be suitably managed? But, provided that
both BTS and AES are fruitful, the conflict is waged in the realms of values,
politics, economics and so on - and where one stands in face of this conflict
feeds back into the strategies one adopts in research.
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Agroecologists clearly recognize this; biotechnologists often do not. 35
Sometimes it is said that the 'theory' of agroecology consists simply of
ideological critique, or at best of a patchwork of opportunistically gleamed
fragments of traditional local knowledge - so that ·the proponents of
agroecology are said not to be proposing a 'scientific' research program but
instead to be submitting scientific claims to ideological critique. This criticism
of agroecology ignores that research under AES has been fruitful (see below),
and that in fact it itself is 'ideological' rather than 'scientific.' Research under
both BTS and AES gains understanding of phenomena of the world and their
possibilities - and aims to do so, as well as to gain understanding pertinent
to value-laden interests in application: ' ... political determinants enter at the
point when basic [my italics] scientific questions are asked and not only at
the time when technologies are delivered to society'. 36 If they do not appear
to do so 'equally', that may be because inequalities of available material and
social conditions enable research under BTS to proceed routinely without
its legitimation constantly being called into question. 37 The reasons both for
and against the adoption of AES, and conversely for the exclusive adoption
of variants of MS, include integrally appeal to value-outlooks. The strategies
are equally 'scientific': held to fruitfulness, and adopted (in part) because of
their relations with value-outlooks. There is not the asymmetry that critics of
agroecology sometimes claim: under MS, investigation is scientific and nonideological, whereas research under AES is non-scientific and ideological.3 8
Those who adopt BTS, misled by the myth of neutrality, tend not only
to downplay the empirical achievements of agroecology and to portray it as
simply an ideology without link with fruitful strategies, but also to be unaware
that the links of biotechnology with MVC refute the neutrality they claim for
their own research. For them, BTS are simply particular instances of materialist
strategies that enable us to identify the possibilities of things (for example,
seeds) that are made available principally from using (for example) methods of
genetic modification. BTS are indeed that; they are also those strategies whose
products do and are expected to inform a particular form of technology, that
is widely and almost entirely applied in practices that express highly MVC.
The first description of BTS shapes research practices; the second serves to
rationalize adopting them rather than other strategies.
Similarly, AES have two descriptions: first, as particular instances of
general ecological strategies - that frame research on the relations and
interactions between an organism and its environment, considered as a more
or less self-regulating 'whole' of which the organism is an integral part-that
enable us to identify the possibilities that things (seeds) have in virtue of their
place in agroecological systems; second, as those strategies that are intended
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to provide knowledge that can inform the agricultural projects expressive of
the values (for example) of 'local empowerment. ' 39
It is in virtue of the first description that AES shape research practices. I
will elaborate a little. Under AES, research aims to confirm generalizations
concerning the tendencies, capacities and functioning of agroecosystems,
their constituents, and relations and interactions among them. These
include generalizations in which (for example) 'mineral cycles, energy
transformations, biological processes and socioeconomic relationships' are
considered in relationship to the whole system; generalizations concerned not
with 'maximizing production of a particular system, but rather with optimizing
the agroecosystem as a whole' and so with 'complex interactions among and
between people, crops, soil and livestock. ' 40 To illustrate:
low pest potentials [are likely] in agroecosystems that exhibit the following
characteristics: high crop density through mixing crops in time and space;
discontinuity of monocultures in time through rotations, use of short maturing
varieties, use of crop-free or preferred host-free periods ... ; small, scattered
fields creating a structural mosaic of adjoining crops and uncultivated land
which potentially provides shelter and alternative food for natural enemies ... ;
farms with a dominant perennial crop component .. . ; high crop densities or
the presence of tolerable levels of specific weed species; high genetic density
resulting from the use of variety mixtures or crop multilines. 41

And:
Restoration of natural controls in agroecosystems through vegetation
management not only regulates pests, but also helps to conserve energy,
improves soil fertility, minimizes risks, and reduces dependence on external
resources. 42

Of particular salience are generalizations that help to identify the possibilities
for productivity and sustainability of agroecosystems, where 'sustainability'
has been defined in terms of four inter-connected characteristics: productive
capacity: 'Maintenance of the productive capacity of the ecosystem'; ecological
integrity: 'Preservation of the natural resource base and functional biodiversity';
social health: 'Social organization and reduction of poverty'; cultural identity:
'Empowerment of local communities, maintenance of tradition, and popular
participation in the development process' .43
Theories, under AES, may be considered to be constrained so as to
be able to represent sets of generalizations of the above kinds, 44 and the
hypotheses (drawn from general ecological theory) that are entertained for their
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explanation and determining the limits of their application. The generalizations
of agroecology tend to express probalilistic relations or tendencies, and they
may have greater or less specificity. So, discerning the limits of application of
these generalizations is especially important. Note how the generalization' ...
enhancement of biodiversity in traditional agroecological systems [in Latin
America] represents a strategy that ensures diverse diets and income sources,
stable production, minimum risk, intensive production with limited resources,
and maximum returns under low levels of technology' is later qualified by' ...
we have still not been able to develop a predictive theory that enables us to
determine what specific elements of biodiversity should be retained, added,
or eliminated to enhance natural pest control. ' 45
Data are selected and sought out in virtue of their relevance for appraising
these theories and for enabling phenomena, relevant in the light of the values
of 'local empowerment,' to be brought within the compass of a theory's
applicability. Obtaining the data often requires subtle, regular, painstaking,
accurate observation and monitoring of a multiplicity and heterogeneity of
details in the agroecosystems. The skills for this are usually only developed by
local farmers themselves, so that gaining the data depends on the collaboration
oflocal farmers and the utilization of their experience and knowledge, and the
lexicon in which they are reported will reflect the distinctions and categories
of this experience. Agroecology cannot be pursued with a sharp distinction
between the researcher and the farmer; the farmer's observations are essential
to the conduct of the research. Quantitative data are often pertinent: counting
the number of pests in a given area, measuring the size of crop yields, amount
of water available and so on; statistical comparisons (for example) of pest
populations across (for example) monocultures and polycultures, or of the
yields of different crops when different methods are used. Experimental data
are sought both to support statistical comparisons, and to demonstrate that
possibilities can be realized in agroecosystems with certain characteristics,
for example: ' ... it is possible to stabilize the insect communities of
agroecosystems by designing and constructing vegetational architectures
that support populations of natural enemies or have direct deterrent effects
on pest herbivores.' 46 In agroecological contexts, an 'experiment' involves
introducing, for the sake of observing its systemic effects, a modification
(under an investigator's control) of an agroecological system. Given the local
distinctiveness of agroecosystems, the mark of a 'good' experiment cannot
be its replicability across diverse environmental and social conditions. Note
that control is involved in agroecological experiments and farming practices,
but subordinated to the values of 'local empowerment.'
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Relevant data are often obtained from the study of farming systems in
which traditional methods informed by traditional local knowledge are used.
These systems are appropriately submitted to empirical scrutiny because
agroecological studies have shown 'that traditional farming systems are
often based on deep ecological rationales and in many cases exhibit a number
of desirable features of socioeconomic stability, biological resilience and
productivity. ' 47 They exemplify many known agroecological principles and
others can be expected to be extracted in the course of studying them. 48 They
can (with adaptations suggested by research findings) be enhanced with respect
to all four of the characteristics listed above, and especially with respect to
'cultural identity' they are often uniquely appropriate for the activities of
poor, small farmers. It is worth noting that the methods used in these systems
have been tested rigorously in practice, and have been particularly effective
(reflecting the experimental approach of traditional farmers) over the centuries
in 'selecting seed varieties for specific environments' 49 - these.are often the
seed varieties (or the original sources of them) that are modified genetically
in biotechnology research and practice. 50
3.3

Adopting a Strategy and the Social Location ofScientific Research

At least in some fields, there can be multiple strategies that compete in the way
described above; and each of the competing strategies may be fruitful. Then
there arises the question of which strategy to adopt, one for which different
answers may be proposed and acted on by different investigators. I have
suggested that actual answers ( explicitly or implicitly) draw upon mutually
reinforcing relations between adopting strategies and the value-outlooks whose
interests would be served especially well by applications of knowledge gained
under the strategies.
There is, however, a general reason to opt in favor of developing research
under some strategies other than MS: to test whether all possibilities, or all
material possibilities upon which non-material possibilities have been assumed
to supervene, can become grasped under MS. By identifying possibilities that
are not identical with possibilities currently encapsulated by soundly accepted
theories under MS, we can pose concrete challenges for research under MS
to meet. This reason would not appeal to Kuhn; he holds that such challenges
are unnecessary since, in due course, anomalies will accumulate in the normal
unfolding of MS. However, there may be bounds to MS, while within the
bounds there remain unlimited possibilities to be identified. Only tests of the
kind indicated here can hope to identify these bounds. (I am not sure that Kuhn
recognized this.) By identifying possibilities of the kinds indicated, it can be
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probed empirically whether or not there are bounds to the development of MS.
This general reason sits in tension with the rationales for adopting specific
strategies, especially when we remember that there is also competition for
resources for conducting research. Resources devoted to probing the limits of
MS in this way would be resources taken away from pursuing more favored
projects and de facto giving the resources to support research whose strategies
gain their primary rationale from competing value-outlooks. Only a satisfactory
resolution of this tension, I believe, could restore neutrality as a compelling
value of scientific practice. 51 The tension is heightened when we consider the
legitimation of applications.
Kuhn's picture, recall, portrays applications mainly as consequences
of scientific developments; and developments under MS have identified
numerous material possibilities that have become, and are continuing to
become, realized in applications at an increasingly rapid rate. The efficacy of
applications depends on the input of sound scientific knowledge that can be
provided (for many applications) by research under MS. The legitimation of
some applications depends also on claims about the possibilities of things.
Consider: under MS, means (involving developments of biotechnology) may
be identified for producing food sufficient in quantity to continue· to feed the
world's population. Applying the knowledge thereby obtained is legitimated,
however, only if there are no 'better' ways of producing sufficient amounts
of food - ways, for example, that would be part of agroecosystems that were
structured so that the food is not only produced, but also so that everyone is
actually fed sufficiently and nutritiously, and that sustainable (and improving)
and productive agroecosystems are maintained. 52 But the possibility of
producing sufficient food by developed and expanded uses of agroecological
methods cannot be investigated under MS. So research under MS cannot
provide a crucial item of knowledge (or the means for attempting to gain it)
needed to legitimate endorsing biotechnological methods as essential to the
solution of the world's food problems.
The proponents of bringing biotechnological methods to the core of
agricultural production respond that there is no evidence that developed
agroecological methods could produce sufficient food. In responding to this
assertion it is important to keep in mind that producing sufficient quantities
of food to feed everyone does not imply that everyone will be fed. Currently,
sufficient food is produced, but hunger persists. 53 Given that agrobiotechnology
plays an integral role in the global economic system, under which hunger
currently persists, one might wonder why the expansion of production of food
promised by the new methods will be any more likely to lead to the hungry
being fed. Who is fed, and who is not, is not independent of the methods of
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production. Even ifthere were strong evidence that enhanced agroecological
methods could not produce sufficient food to feed everyone, it might still be
the case that agroecology needs to be developed so that the currently hungry
and their descendants will be fed. The legitimation of the furthering of
agroecology needs only this more modest claim which, I believe, is the claim
that agroecologists actually make. Perhaps, in order that everyone be fed, a
variety of farming methods will have to be used. The issue is an empirical one,
but investigations conducted exclusively under MS cannot adequately address
it. It can only be responsibly investigated within a theoretical framework that
investigates the full causal nexus of production and consumption of food, and
more generally of human well-being, and in a process that is responsive to
the needs, interests and value-outlooks of everyone.
As things stand, it is true that the evidence is less than compelling
that agroecological methods can be enhanced and expanded to produce
sufficient food to feed everyone. However, that could be because, while
AES have displayed a measure of fruitfulness, their limits have effectively
been reached; or because, due to lack of the necessary social conditions and
material resources, there has been much less research conducted under AES
than under BTS. This matter could be explored empirically by providing
conditions to further develop agroecology in those areas where there is hunger
and an available rural workforce (thus furthering it under the legitimation
of the modest claim referred to in the previous paragraph, in areas where its
effectiveness has been repeatedly demonstrated; 54 this would enable virtually
risk-free investigation of the possibilities of agroecological production.
The proponents of biotechnological methods see little urgency in conducting
such an investigation because, I think, the widespread implementation of
agroecological methods would be incompatible with the social structures,
values and policies under which biotechnology is developing. For them,
agroecological methods cannot produce sufficient food because they cannot
be developed under these social conditions. There is, for these proponents,
no better way to produce the needed food, because biotechnological methods
are confirmed as providing the most efficacious of the available possibilities
whose realization could be informed by theories established under MS, and
thus could most usefully further the expression of MVC; and, for them,
furthering MVC (and so, at the present moment, fitting into the neo-liberal
global economic project) has become a condition on a legitimated way. In
short, the legitimation available to be offered of prioritizing biotechnological
methods - without begging questions whose empirically grounded answers
require developments of AES - does not rest upon empirical confirmation that
agroecological methods are insufficient for producing the food. It rests upon
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commitment to MVC (and the values of 'globalization'), upon valuing the
material possibilities of biotechnology because to realize them is, at one and
the same time, to realize valued social possibilities.
There are no 'scientific' reasons to decline to appraise empirically the
possibilities of agroecology. Given that applications involve issues not only
of efficacy, but also of legitimation or social value, it is just arbitrary to insist
that what counts as a 'scientifically' interesting phenomenon is determined
only in view of the internal unfolding of the scientific tradition and not also by
interests connected with application. Thus, the competition between BTS and
AES cannot be dissolved by appealing to the general character of science. The
marginalization ofAES in the mainstream, I have suggested, is explained (when
we probe for the reasons) not because, after adequately providing for efforts
to develop them, serious doubts about their fruitfulness have been confirmed.
Rather it is because they cannot lead to applications of interest for MVC; and
perhaps also because, if their fruitfulness were confirmed, the legitimation of
prioritizing biotechnology in agriculture would be challenged - though in fact
the proponents of biotechnology tend not even to entertain that the far-reaching
fruitfulness ofAES might, given the opportunity, be confirmed. 55 Conversely,
the reasons for adopting AES (which, I repeat, draw upon basic knowledge
gained under MS in all sorts of ways) as an alternative to BTS are connected
with critique of MVC and with holding such competing value-outlooks as
that of' local empowerment.' Either way, adoption of strategies, and thus the
character of research conducted, is unintelligible if separated from the social
location of scientific practices and their applications; and thus, in tum, social
location can serve as a ground (but not one that downplays the importance of
fruitfulness) for critique of scientific practices, and as a source and condition
of alternatives.

4 Conclusion
The object of scientific inquiry is phenomena as grasped under a strategy,
so much so that it varies with strategies and cannot be characterized in
strategy-neutral terms. That is Kuhn's insight. Strategies, a key component of
scientific methodology, are historically variable, and so too is the object
of scientific inquiry.
To understand phenomena is to describe and explain them, and to identify
the possibilities they admit. A strategy has the resources to identify a particular
class of possibilities. Any one strategy is worthy of adoption only if, given
the opportunity and appropriate resources, it shows itself to be fruitful: that
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is, if it is successful in actually identifying possibilities of the relevant class
(encapsulating them in soundly accepted theories). Competing strategies
explore classes of possibilities (often of the same phenomena, for example,
seeds) that cannot be co-realized: for example, realizing (to any significant
extent) the possibilities of transgenic seeds cannot be co-realized with certain
possibilities of productive and sustainable agroecosystems.
When two fruitful strategies compete, what are the reasons to adopt one of
them rather than the other? Since both are fruitful, reasons based exclusively on
cognitive (epistemic) value cannot favor one rather than the other. As illustrated
in the discussion of Section 3, my answer is: Adopt the one that enables us to
gain understanding that is applicable to phenomena and (where appropriate)
in practical projects of significance for our value-outlooks, thus the one that
identifies possibilities that, if realized on application, would further these
projects. This provides a good reason to adopt a strategy without, at the same
time, denying that the scope and value of the basic understanding gained in
scientific research transcend interest in applications. It is a reason that points
to the (social) value of research conducted under the strategy.
Both fruitfulness and applicability are necessary conditions for the adoption
of a strategy. We adopt a strategy partly for the sake of gaining theories that are
applicable in ways that are significant for our value-outlooks. In a particular
field of research, there may be no relevant disagreements across value-outlooks
about what are the phenomena and projects for which applications of theories
are desired. Then competing strategies are unlikely to emerge. Different valueoutlooks, however, may (in some fields) lead to different appraisals of the
significance (social value) of applications, and thus to their respective adherents
adopting competing strategies (for example, AES and BTS). Where this
happens, a case can be made that a plurality of strategies should appropriately
be supported within the whole scientific community (despite the resulting
tensions that would be occasioned by the fact that the classes of possibilities
being explored are not co-realizable in the same contexts). Moreover, if my
suggestion is correct, it will be no surprise that one kind of strategy comes to
be adopted virtually exclusively in the scientific community, and that adopting
a strategy is not generally recognized as a matter of choice or as in need of
rational support, when in it and its supporting institutions there is hegemony
of values (for example, MVC or those of the global economy).
According to the picture I have offered, application plays a central role
in shaping scientific practice. It is not just a consequence (or instrumental
partner) of successful research, but where it is valued in social practices that
one endorses, it is part of the very reason to adopt a strategy. We might put
it: Possibilities, in so far as they are identical to possibilities for application,
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partly constitute the object of scientific inquiry. Such possibilities, of course,
are objects of social value and historically and culturally variable, functions
of the social location of the scientific practices. The strategies we adopt are
those suitable for exploring these possibilities, and so they too must vary as
a function of the social location of scientific practices. Thus, applications
- successful, desired, anticipated - feed back so as to influence at the most
fundamental methodological level the way in which scientific investigation
is conducted.
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ecology (which is not confined to deployment of MS) usually is considered to fall under
the umbrella of modem science.
Kuhn (1970) has developed this idea in a rich way using the phenomenological notion
of 'world.' The objects of the 'world' in which investigations under MS are conducted
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also note 55).
Cf. Hoyningen-Huene (1993), pp. 241-3.
Lacey(1999a),pp.172-5; 1999e.
Kuhn (1956).
Kuhn (1970).
Lacey (1999a), Ch. 7.
Cartwright (1999).
Of course, this does not prove that there is no such underlying order, as Sankey (1997)
- see Lacey (1999c)-has emphasized.
Lacey (1999a), 14-15.
Here I only present my alternative picture, showing how it illuminates an important
contemporary controversy. See Lacey (1999a, Ch. 7; 1999e) for fuller argument.
Endorsing the values expressed and furthered by the prevailing social order may provide
a good reason to adopt MS virtually exclusively - of course, the reason is only as good
as the grounds for endorsing these values (Lacey (1999a), Ch. 6). That they are widely
endorsed, and expressed deeply in dominant modem economic and political projects, may
largely explain that scientific research is conducted almost exclusively under MS.
Kloppenburg (1987); Lacey (1999a, Ch. 8) and the references there.
Lacey (1999a), Ch. 4; 1999b.
See Lacey (1999a), pp. 111- 30, for a detailed analysis ofMVC and for the argument-also
Lacey, 1999d.
Lacey (1997); Lacey (1999a), Ch. 8.
Control of natural phenomena is, of course, a value for them - as it is in every culture
- but, unlike in MVC, it is subordinated to the listed core values.
My account of agroecology here is derived from the numerous writings ofAltieri (especially
Altieri, 1995) with some adaptations of terminology (that involve little strain) so as to fit
into my general analytic framework. (See also Lacey, 1999a: Ch. 8.)
On biotechnology: ' ... in essence [biotechnology] implies the use of microbial, animal
or plant cells or enzymes to synthesize, breakdown or transform materials . . .. Traditional
biotechnology refers to the conventional techniques that have been used for many centuries
to produce beer, wine, cheese and many other foods, while "new" biotechnology embraces
all methods of genetic modification by recombinant DNA and cell fusion techniques,
together with modem developments of "traditional" biotechnological processes' (Smith,
1996: 2-3). In the text I am using 'biotechnology' in the sense of 'the "new" biotechnology.'
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I am also taking it to refer to a field of scientific research: that conducted under BTS,
research that aims to produce knowledge that can enhance the methods specified in the
quote. Thus, depending on contest, 'biotechnology' may refer either to a field of scientific
research or to specific methods deployed in agricultural practices.
Note that the way in which AES and BTS compete does not preclude that each may
draw from the positive results of the other in limited respects. In this chapter I will
not explore whether and how this might happen. On the relationship of the kind of
competition, exemplified by that between AES and BTS, with what Kuhn has called
'incommensurability,' see Lacey, 1999e; and see the next paragraph for how it involves the
difficulties of communication that Kuhn diagnoses to be part of incommensurability.
See the exchange between Altieri and Rosset (2000) and McGloughlin (2000).
Altieri (1994), pp. 150-51.
See note 18 above.
McGloughlin (2000).
In both cases (BTS and AES) the adopting of the strategies is rationalized (in part) by
reference to particular values. This does not per se challenge the impartiality (sound
acceptance) of the results consolidated under either strategy; it may their neutrality. In
the case of AES, since objects (including agroecosystems themselves) are not abstracted
from their places in human experience and social relations, values enter into the subjectmatter of the investigation: under what conditions are certain values (for example, social
justice, cultural identity) able to be further embodied? (Under MS, all comparable questions
are pushed into the social science inquiries that may inform applications.) Note that the
questions (posed under AES) are about the degree of embodiment and manifestation of the
values; reaching empirically based results about them (as distinct, perhaps, from having an
interest in them) is logically independent of endorsing the values. There can be impartial
results about the degree of manifestation and embodiment of values (Lacey, 1999a,
Ch. 2).
Altieri (1987), pp. xiv-xv.
Altieri (1999), pp. 24-5.
Altieri (1994), p. 150.
Altieri et al. (1996), pp. 367-8.
See Lacey ( 1999a), pp. 193- 6 for further discussion.
Altieri (1994), pp. 7, 38.
Ibid., p. 7.
Altieri (1987), p. xiii; for details and examples, see Altieri, 1995: Ch. 6.
Altieri (1995), p. 143.
Ibid., p. 116.
Kloppenburg (1987); Lacey (1999a), Ch. 8.
Lacey (1999a), Ch. 10.
Altieri and Rosset (2000); Kloppenburg and Burrows (1996). Other important issues are
also involved in the legitimation of prioritizing (or even using) biotechnological methods:
for example, concerning possible undesirable health and environmental side-effects. They
have been widely discussed (see, for example, Rissler and Mellon, 1996).
Boucher (1999).
Altieri et al. (1996).
My explanation is consistent with it being the case that, in the consciousness of researchers
in biotechnology, they are simply following through on the latest options provided under
MS, with no issue of choice of strategy involved (see note 18). If there is no choice of
strategy, then criticism of biotechnology becomes seen simply as criticism of engaging
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in research per se, or as having the effect of threatening funds for research. Some recent
reactions of biotechnology researchers to criticism have been of this kind. Ironically, they
see threats to the ' autonomy' of science coming more from their critics than from the
corporate sponsors of much of their research.
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